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BOOK REVIEWS
Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age
Michael Novak
Thomas Nelson, Nashville, Tenn., 1983, 144 pp., $3.95.
The present booklet is a collection of articles on nuclear warfare by Mi_cha~l
Novak most of which were previously published in various journals. The title IS
borro~ed from the most important article in the booklet, which takes the form of
a letter from Catholic clergy and laity on nuclear warfare . Although written by
Novak, it was signed by more than a hundred Catholic clergy and laymen. !he
letter was motivated by concern about the earlier drafts of the recent Amencan
bishops' statement on war and peace. Although the final dra~t of the bish?p~'
atatement took a position not too distant from that found m the letter, It 1s
helpful to see the approach of the letter to the problem . _
_
While the letter recognizes the unique problem ra1sed by the discovery of
nuclear weapons , it also calls attention to the fact that this is not the first time
Christians have confronted the apocalyptic question. It is also reluctant to look at
the whole issue in terms of the worst possible scenario. So it is more hesitant,
then about the condemnation of any use of nuclear weapons than the bishops'
state'ment seemed to be. The bishops expressed themselves highly skeptical about
any use of nuclear weapons .
. Equal concern was shown in the Novak letter for the threat t~at comes from
the Marxist camp and the danger of blackmail arising from any d1splay of weakness.
On the issue of deterrence, the letter takes a stronger position than the bishops.
Again the fears of the bishops are more on the side of the arms race, and ~he
dange~s inherent in it. The letter focuses more on the risks involved in weake~mg
one's deterrence capabilities. Although aware of these risks, I would have to_d1ffer
with the Jetter on the question of intention in reference to deterrence. Wh1le not
allowing actual use, the letter considers the intention to use such _w~apons ~
necessary element of deterrence. This goes contrary to the whole Chnshan tradition in which sin begins in the intention.
_
There must obviously be some intention behind the possessiOn of nuclear
weapons. Otherwise, they would not even exist. The intention may and _m':lst go as
far as use for deterrence. ·In fact, it may even go so far as actual use w~thm moral
limits. But even if one were to hold that no actual use could be m~ral , and
therefore would allow no intention of actual use, I do not see ho~ th1s ;would
inhibit or weaken deterrence. In other words, I do not see why the mtentlon of
actual use should be considered necessary for the effectiveness of a deterrent.
Since intention is strictly internal, it is hard to see how it can have any external
impact in itself. The threat comes from actual possession of the weapons. As lo~g
II a country possesses such weapons, the enemy countr~ will _feel a thr~at. Th1s
Will remain true even if a country insists it has no mtentwn of usmg such
weapons. But it must be admitted that Novak becomes a little ambiguous about
the kind of intention about which he is speaking.
.
In the second article, Novak views the confrontation between the Umte~ St~tes
llld the Soviet Union as it appears to Europeans. After World War II until fairly
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recent times, the United States covered Europe with an extremely effectiv• iefensive umbrella. Since 1972, however, the Soviet military buildup of conv• tiona!
and both strategic and theatre nuclear weapons has rendered this umbre!J;- u gely
ineffective. The resulting insecurity and terror have caused a variety of r. ~ t ions
among Europeans, not all of which are healthy. Novak's concern is that · .s fear
and terror may lead to unfortunate compromises or capitulation.
The third chapter is devoted to the statement of the American bisho p s ~ ovak
judges, and with good reason, that the final draft was far superior to the 1 ;t two
drafts. He attributes this largely to the meeting held in Rome in January 1983)
between the drafters of the American bishops ' statement and the presi{ .1ts of
some of the European conferences. To his satisfaction, he found that t .., final
draft was much closer to the position taken in Moral Clarity in the Nu c /, r A ge,
and therefore was more acceptable.
In the final chapter, Novak reveals a certain skepticism about the possll ' ity of
just negotiations with the Soviets. Given their proclivities, their pote n ' ·:..I and
consequent intentions, he sees a certain naivete in the expectations of so m ' peace
groups that preemptive surrender would solve the problem of nuclear wa rf;·,~ .
One will find in Novak a very realistic estimate of the current nuclea r d <~'1 ge r as
well as the kind of moral clarity that results not from intimidation but fr,· n cool
and careful reasoning.

Wade legislatures clearly are free to insist that the interest of the fetus completely

override the woman 's in the third trimester of the pregnancy."
Appeals to restrict or prohibit abor~ion on the ~ounds _that it destr~y~ h~ma?
life are, Harrison says, intrinsically sexist. In fact, 1f the history of Chnst1am~y Js
viewed objectively from a liberating feminist perspective, one will see,. Ha:nson
claims that the major reason why abortion was condemned throughout th1s h1story
was n~t that it entailed a choice to kill innocent human life or life on its way to
. being human. Rather it was condemned because the males who exercised power
within Christianity sought thereby to punish the women they deemed sexually
wanton by forcing them to bear children agairist their wills. Women to?ay who .
oppose abortion because they think it violates the good of human hfe ~~st
therefor.e realize, Harrison argues, that they have been co-opted by mascuhmst
oppressors of women.
.
Not only are .appeals to restrict or proscribe abortion on the grounds that 1t
kills innocent human life sexist, but they are also irrational in Harrison's view. It is
genuinely absurd, she thinks, to call a conceptus a human being, for it is no_t "an
actually alive organism ." She admits that late-gestating fetuses can count bJOlogically as individuated human life and therefore require from us some respect (the
nature of which is never identified, but one gathers that it must be akin to the
respect _we owe dogs and cats). Nonetheless, late-gestating fetuses are not t<:' be
regarded as persons in any morally significant sense. In fact, although Harnson
·-John R. Connery, S.J
thinks it is morally prudent to err by imputing "personhood" to neonates, even
Loyola University o f Ch icago
newborns are not persons in the full sense; thus infanticide, although by no me~ns
morally indifferent, is surely justifiable. In connection with the value of fetal hfe,
Harrison cites approvingly the comment of Charles Hartshorne to the effect that
the central nervous system of a very premature baby can be compared to that of a
pig, and the moral and policy implications of this observation are heartily
endorsed.
The foregoing paragraphs accurately summarize the major positions Ha~rison
takes in the name of the "new ethic of abortion." Underlying all of them IS her
claim that no one with any moral sensitivity to the real lives of women can
possibly find anything morally repugnant in abortion . Indeed, in her mind, only
those who demean women and, in all likelihood, take delight in the execution of
criminals and in the killing of enemies in war can have the arrogance to oppose
abortion under the slogan of the right to life.
.
What of this new ethic of abortion and its presuppositions? It needs to be sa1d
Beverly Wildung Harrison
first that Harrison assumes throughout the contemporary ideology of nonprocreaBeacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1983, xi+ 334 pp., ·$18. 95.
~ve sex. By this I mean that she, with many moderns, completely _s:ver~ any
Intrinsic link between genital sex and procreation . For her, sexual act1v1ty Js one
Before comm_e~ting o~ the "new ethic of abortion" advanced by Harrison, · ,
thing, _reproductive activity another, and the two are merged only when those
f~~f~ss~r Cfh~~tl~n. Ethics at Union Theological Seminary and past president of
choosing
genital sex freely opt to procreate. She regards sexual pleasure, totall~
OCJe Y o
nst1an Ethics, it will be helpful to provide a summary of her
.
divorced from any link to procreation, as a "foundational value"; and she ev_JVJewAs so dt?at readHers can have an overview of the sort of ethic that she proposes.
dently holds that all adults male and female alike, have the right to enhance the1r
ccor
mg to arrison every woman h as an absolute right to control her pro.
Well-being by securing this' foundational value, whether within ma;riage_or no,
crea t 1ve power as she sees fit El t'
bo ·
tion _
.
·
ec Ive a rtJon as a backup to . contracep·
Whether through heterosexual or homosexual activity. Although m th1s work
an~ Hharnson strongly favors barrier methods since they are Jess hazardous
t o women s ealth- is an absolut I
Harrison develops no norms · for the exercise of genital sexuality, s?e app~re?tly
f
this · h
. .
e Y necessary means to guarantee the exercise o
holds that any form of genital behavior between consenting adults IS permiSsible.
t nf. t. ~ny restri_c tJOns whatsoever on access to abortion, including clauses
. I have, in commenting on Harrison's work, chosen first to focus _on the sex_ual
pro elc mgb t e conscience of hospitals, nurses, and doctors who h ave moral
scrup es a out the procedure are gr
1
· t
· ld~iogy underlying her approach because it is so cent~al to her e~t1re enter~r~se.
r · t 'd 1
ave Y un]us , the arrogant attemp t by mascu·
'
It II central because she explicitly contends that the cla1m, rooted m the Ch~tstla?
/ms_ ~ eo ~gues (overt or covert) to rob women of the social power ex clusively
tradition, that there is an intrinsic link between genital sex and procreatiOn Js
emm_me, o control the reproduction of the species. Thus a major ~ r iter ion for
lleXiat in origin, a ploy designed by males to keep women submissive and in slave?
:s;~mf. ttht': mocal wo~t~ of any society is the extent to which it organ izes its life
to their biology. She seems not to notice that the sexual ideology she accepts Js
. m~ 1 ~ Ions to facJ!Jtate and expand access to elective abortion Judged by
Pleeise!y the same as that advanced by Hugh Hefner. Although she would doubt~~Is ~~~~rJOn, t_h ': s~ial a?d legal structures of the United States, ev~n after Jan.
~- challenge me, I submit that her own understanding of sexuality is thoroughly
'
• are Iniquitous Insofar as, Harrison informs her readers, "under Roe u.
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Toward a New Ethic of Abortion
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gnostic and Manichean in origin, for it regards the procreative meaning · enital
sex as a mere material given , something purely biological, subhuman a n ' !bper·
sonal in nature, while regarding the relational aspect of genital sexua lit ~
alone
of personal and human significance . It was precisely to oppose this de h ·. nizing
they
view of sexuality- in which women are thought to be goddesses W <
provide males with the "foundational value" of sexual pleasure and a t udged
otherwise simply high-grade domestic chattel - that the biblical unde rsta: •ng of
sexuality as integrally unitive and procreative (cf. Genesis 1 and 2) was d ~ to ped.
(On this, see John L. McKenzie, The Two-Edged Sword, chapter on "G c" J f the
Semites." )
Harrison completely ignores the fact that the Christian tradition o n ~· uality,
rooted in this biblical vision , consistently has sought to hold both n .~s and
females to the same moral norms and consistently has taught that only t foster·
ing the virtue of chastity can human persons, whether male or fe m al make
committed love possible.
In her feminist revision of Christian history on abortion, Harrison rn a . s J ohn
T . Noonan the scapegoat. In her judgment, Noonan fails in his efforts, b <.. '· in his
lengthy book on contraception and in his various studies on abortion , , -> show
that this tradition rejected abortion on the grounds that it' constituted a at tack
on the value of unborn human life. Her own position, as noted already , is .1at the
major reason why Christian tradition rejected abortion was the sexisr, of the
males who exercised power within Christendom . ·In my view , a calm r e .. ling of
Noonan, John Connery and others on this subject suffices to refute th < neakly
argued and flimsily documented case which Harrison advances. But in rr: m ind,
what is quite ironic about Harrison's study is her unquestioned acc e p • _, nee of
Noonan's questionable claim that Christian theologians, until the very re t> nt past
(with the exception of such oddballs as Martin Le Maistre in the 15th C • •Jt ury),
unanimously required positive procreative intent for marital i'nterco u r s·' to be
fully legitimate. On this issue, as studies by Favian Parmisano (cf. his " Lc ve and
Marriage in the Middle Ages, " New Blackfriars, 1969) and Germain Grisez (c f. his
"Marriage : Reflections Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and Vatican C o u Hcil II,"
Catholic Mind, July, 1965) have made clear, it has long been reco gnized by
Christian theologians that there are nonprocreative purposes to the mar ital act and
that it is indeed a way for spouses to communicate a "singular kind of love." Had
Harrison 's research carried her beyond Noonan and others (like Sherw in Derrick
Bailey) who caricature the Christian tradition · on sexuality to original sourc es, she
would have learned not only that long before modern times this trad itio n recognized the value of conjugal love, but also that-it supports the claims o f Noonan.
Connery and others on the value of human life in utero.
Although she claims that t he "conceptus" cannot even be regarded as "actually
alive, " Harrison does admit that as it develops, the fetus clearly is a " form of
human life " and is indeed biologically an individual member of the hum an species.
Yet, like Michael Tooley and others, she drives a sharp wedge between a living
member of the human species and being a person. In her opinion, unbo rn human
beings, newborns and others- perhaps those in iron lungs (cf. p. 21 7, where a
capacity to breathe in a self-initiated way is included among her c riteria for
personhood)- are not persons because they do not meet her criteria for person·
hood . Since person is a philosophical notion and since different ph ilosophical
concepts of person abound, she is free to adopt whatever concept she m ay wish (I
accept that of Boethius, according to which a person is an individual substance of
an intelligent nature , and according to which living members of the h uman
species, including 'unborn human beings, are persons). But she is no t, I submit,
free to impose her notion of personhood on fellow members of the hum a n species
and deny to those members of the human species whom she regards as nonpe rsons
the protection of the law of homicide which protects her and those mem bers of
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the human species she generously includes within her concept of person. Her own
philosophical notion of person, in which a consciously experiencing " I " is crucial,
fits in well with the Manichean dual'ism undergirding her sexual ideology . What she
fails to consider is the argument that membership in the human species is itself of
critical moral significance and is so because the human animal differs radically in
kind from other animals (on this see Mortimer Adler's The Difference of Man and
the Difference It Makes) . Her failure to consider this fatally flaws her chapter on
the value of fetal life .
Our Right to Choose is, in essence, a very arrogant book . Its credibility is
indicated, I think, by Harrison 's claim, already 'noted, that Roe v. Wade clearly
allows legislatures to put the interests of the "fetus" above those of the woman in
her third trimester of pregnancy. Harrison, of course, simply fails to notify her
readers that Roe v. Wade includes a very generous " unlessment" clause in its
holding that the state might, .because of its interest in the " potential life" of the
viable fetus, entirely proscribe abortions. The unlessment held that such proscriptions could be overridden should this be necessary in order to protect the life or
health (including the psychological and emotional health) of the woman. Since
Harrison chose to conceal from her readers this generous "unlessment" clause in
Roe v. Wade, she chose to falsify its significance . Her choice here is indicative of
the strategy followed in her arrogant volume . I submit that the "new ethic of
abortion" she advocates, accurately summarized at the beginning of this review, is
SUfficient to enable morally sensitive readers to realize that her "new ethic" is the
ethic of Alice in Wonderland and of Orwell's 1984, for her new ethic would coerce
Jlersons opposed to abortion not only to fund them but also, should they be
nurses or doctors, actively to participate in them against their own consciences.
-William E . May
Associate Professor of Moral Theology
Catholic University of America

The Death Decision: Eight Experts Address
the Legal and Ethical Issues Emerging
on the Frontier of Today,s New Biology
. Leonard J. Nelson, Editor
Servant Books, Ann Arbor, Mfch ., 1984, xiii + 179 pp., $7.95, paper.
. Even 25 years ago, the Judeo-Christian ethic seemed the unshakable found~
tion for moral decision-making in medicine. Today , as everyone knows, that eth1c
· ~ rather badly on the defensive. Having lost its dominant position , it now _finds
Itself an often unheeded and even despised minority view . Nowhere is th1s fact
dearer than in the sanctity-of-life issues of abortion and euthanasia.
It is, therefore, heartening to encounter scholarship seeking to renew and apply
the Judeo-Christian tradition on precisely these issues. The Death Decision (however clumsy the title) represents just such scholarship, assembling eight ess~y_s by
IUcb luminaries as John T . Noonan, Jr. of Berkeley and George Huntston Williams
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of Harvard, as well as by other scholars of lesser reknown seeking to re •:.lp the
Judeo-Christian tradition for use in contemporary bioethics. The writer
oan an
ecumenical range : Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Evangelicals a
repre·
sented. All the writer.s are, however, avowed Christians.
The essays were originally presented as papers at the 0 . W. Coburn ~ 10ol of
Law's annual Christianity and Law Seminar, held November 11-13, 19 8
!'he 0 .
W. Coburn School of Law is a new law school under the auspices of Or · ,o berts
University in Oklahoma City . The law school's expressly sectarian . aracter
aroused a controversy at the t ime the school was accredited by the Arne ·an Bar
Association several years ago. The present volume indicates that the sch )I is, in
fact, capable of sponsoring work of serious academic character and of fof ring an
ecumenical approach, at least among Christian churches.
The primary value of this volume is, not surprisingly, to be found in i r :Jistinc·
tively Christian perspective - a needed complement to secular debates
which
Christians can and do participate, but through which Christians can ], d ly be
expected to renew the sources of 'their own moral identity. Nonchristia1 cannot
object to, and may even benefit from, attempts at renewed Christian s;, ·-under·
standing such as the present one.
Several of the authors seek to develop Christian moral identity from i:. portant
traditional sources. John Noonan, for example, looks to history to ide ;ify the
fundamental values Christians always and everywhere have seen as a t -take in
human reproduction. John A. Eidsmoe explores · the biblical view of t.; ,, moral
status of the fetus. Peter Riga examines the Christian ethos of death . F inally,
George Huntston Williams (a Protestant!) attempts to show how the na tot rallaw
can provide a framework for reaching and communicating Judeo-Christi a ,; e thical
norms within a secular society. Together, these essays offer a thou gh t ~· , tl basis
toward consolidating an authentically Christian ethical perspective.
Several writers are concerned with the problem of the erosion of J u d t- -Chris·
tian principles, even among ostensibly Christian bodies, during the pas t decade·
and-a-half. In a very useful survey, Leonard J . Nelson III, for example, d o c uments
that some denominational groups support what is, or looks very much like, abor·
tion on demand. He cites the United Methodist Church Lutheran C h u rch of
America, Presbyterian Church in the United States, United Presbyteria n Church,
United Church of Christ, American Union of Hebrew Congregations, A m erican
Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., and the Protestant Episcopal Church in t h e United
States. Apparently it is now naive to assume that every institutional s t ructure
inherited by Christians remains a vehicle for values of our Judeo-Chris t ian heritage. There is a corresponding call in several essays for new institutional s t r uctures
in the form of Christian medical schools and ethics institutes, which c a n preserve
and communicate Christian values in an authentic manner.
Based on their consideration of traditional Christian sources the a uthors
address various pressing bioethics problems of the day. Abortion-~n-demand is
viewed by nearly all the authors as our society's most serious moral problem.
Unfortunately, none of the writers is optimistic that meaningful legal restrictions
can be reintroduced in this area in the near future. In his essay, Charles Ri ce notes
that advancing technology may be moving abortion into a literally "private" area
beyond the scope of legal control. The widely-publicized anti-progesterone named
RU-486 has the potential for making surgical abortions unnecessary. In the fore·
seeable future, most abortions will be by pill , injection , or other met h od which
can be self-administered .
In Rice's view, the contemporary medical and legal dynamic may actuallY
cause further deterioration, rather than the improvement some have hope d for, in
the legally-recognized rights of the weak and unborn. Rice fears that m ere elective
abortion may be giving way to compulsory abortion for certain pregnancies. The
threat of malpractice and wrongful birth suits is pressuring physicians to counsel

the possibility of abortion and even to exert pressure on the patient to undergo
abortion. Rice hypothesizes that parents may themselves soon become directly
IUbject to the legal pressure to abort certain pregnancies. Such direct legal preslUre will result if and when wrongful birth suits are recognized against the parent.
Professor Rice urges concerted action to remove such legal pressures from doctors
and to prevent their application to parents, in order to prevent further erosion of
human rights in this area.
Euthanasia forms the second major area of concern after abortion for these
authors. Peter Riga deals with the treatment of defective newborns, which now
may include the withholding of ordinary food arid water. Walter Probert explores
the moral requirements of treating incompetent adults. Both Riga and Probert are
concerned that due process and equal protection guarantees be extended to the
individuals they are considering.
Harold 0 . J . Brown is concerned with clarifying slippery euthanasia language
that could confuse the public into sanctioning morally unacceptable practices.
Brown's point is that " passive" euthanasia (withholding treatment) is only pe rmislible if the intent is to spare the patient pain . It is impermissible if the intent is to
kill the patient.
George Huntston Williams steps back from the particular problems of abortion
and euthanasia to consider globally what a renewed Hippocratic ethic for the
medical profession should look like. He establishes seven middle axioms which
Would allow doctors to arrive at concrete moral norms. Williams's middle axioms
are thought-provoking and deserve attention. Since he is a church historian, however, it is not surprising that the moral reasoning which he develops in support of
biasystem is not as clear as might be wished by an ethicist.
The authors in this volume present a number of solutions to the problems they
raile. Invariably these solutions stress the need for sensitive cooperation between
the medical profession and the legal system. This cooperation .is seen as having for
ita goal respect for professional medical judgment, respect for the rights of the
individual patient, and respect for the ethical norms which must originate outside
of medicine.
While this volume will be of lively interest to anyone concerned with contempOrary public policy pr~blems of law and medicine, particularly those espousing
~ristian values, the book is not without its limitations. First, because it is aimed
at a mixed audience drawn from various professions, it lacks the tight argumentation and solid references which would satisfy the scholar in any given area,
whether law, medicine, or ethics.
The authors, moreover, employ diverse ethical methodologies which may well
be compatible, but which are not explicitly justified .or harmonized with each
other. This is relevant insofar as the volume attempts to contribute to a meaningful ethical consensus. A particularly nagging flaw is the authors ' seeming inability
to mediate effectively between the data from Christian sources which they
lllarshal and the concrete ethical analysis they undertake on contemporary probleDla. Noonan, Eidsmoe, ·and Riga's essays are all unfortunately marked by a
Dearly complete caesura between theological discussion and ethical analysis.
Professor Williams erroneously identifies Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, a married
Catholic layman, as a member of the Society of Jesus.
. On the whole, however, The Death Decision is a welcome addition to the
4iacuuion of public policy in the area of law and medicine. It will be particularly
lllefui to the educated layman seeking to elaborate responsible Christian positions
011 the questions of abortion and euthanasia.
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-William Joseph Wagner
Columbus School of Law
Catholic University of America
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Challenge to Love Gay and Lesbian Catholics in the Chu

~h

Robert Nugent, Editor
Crossroad, New York, 1983, xiv + 290 pp., $10.95 (paper).
The essays in this volume discuss issues of homosexuality from m u pie per·
spectives : societal, biblical , theological, pastoral, and vocational (vis a vis· arriage,
religious life, and priesthood). Since, in a brief review, it is impossible t ·valuate
all the contributions, I shall note the general themes of the authors. Sv• e stress
the homosexual way of life as an alternative lifestyle, not only as an o r ntation,
but as a form of behavior morally good so long as it involves commitm •· ;t to one
person. Those disagreeing are cailed homophobic, i.e., "irrationally " fraid of
homosexuals . Others attack the traditional and official teaching of the (" ·urch on
homosexual activity in various ways. Explicit scriptural condemnation s ·; f homosexual activity in Leviticus and Romans are said to not really apply t o ,he con·
temporary understanding of such activity . The sacred writers did not u rc Jerstand
the condition of homosexuality, and they were really condemning h eterosexuals
performing such acts. Arguments which regard homosexual acts as u n n ::; tural are
dismissed as not in accord with current psychiatric insights affirming h om osexual
orientation and activity as psychologically healthy .
Edward Malloy, however , argues for the traditional magisterial p o s1tio n. He
stresses that "homosexual genital activity can be said to be unnatural " because " it
is unable to embody the procreative dimension of the committed sex u al relation·
ship" (p. 110). Unfortunately, while noting the difficulty which h o m sexuals
experience in maintaining a faithful relationship, Malloy leaves the do o r o pen for
the moral acceptance of "faithful" unions involving homosexual activity by not
stressing that such are morally wrong (p . 113).
Margaret Farley's attempt to justify same-sex relations is based upon a denial of
the truth asserted in Humanae Vitae that the unitive and procreative d imensions
of human genital love are always essentially interrelated. Arguing that t he tradi·
tion does not place an absolute ban on homosexual genital relationsh ips, FarleY
seeks to establish the moral goodness of committed homosexual relat io nships
upon the norms of justice. These include "respect for persons through respec t for
autonomy and relationality; respect for relationality through requirem ents of
mutuality, equality , commitment and fruitfulness" (p . 105). Having aba ndoned
the norm consistently taught by the Church for centuries, Farley h ad to find
other norms which, however, are necessarily vague, whether applied to hetero·
sexual or homosexual relations. She herself implies as much.
In her endeavor to develop a moral methodology based upon all the d isciplines,
Lisa Cahill gives decisive weight to the data of empirical sciences, th ereby su?·
ordinating magisterial teaching rooted in scripture and tradition . A sim iiar bias_10
favor of empirical studies permeates the pastoral perspectives, which a re defect_1ve
also in that they do not give serious attention to empirical studies c hallengiOg
their idealization of homosexual love. Here one finds not balanced scholarship bu t
advocacy for a homosexual lifestyle. Homosexuals must not be depri ved of their
right to genital expression in "loving" relationships.
Bruce Williams, however, takes exception to this trend by affirming tradi t ional
principles ; nonetheless, he proposes an argument by which homosex uals w~o
believe that their genital expression in a steady relationship is good m ay receive
the Eucharist. Williams uses good-faith analogies employed by some con fessors 10
the guidance of contraceptive-users and of divorced-remarried, both of whom are
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allowed to receive the Eucharist so long as they are convinced that contraception
ia not sinful, or that they have a right to genital relationships in an invalid marriage. He also invokes the practice of giving the Eucharist to Protestants who ,
while believing in the Real Presence, hold that contraception and remarriage after
divorce are morally good. Why, then, inquires Williams, should not homosexuals
living in a faithful relationship, which they regard as good , be allowed to receive
the Eucharist?
· Without denying that there are special circumstances in which a person may be
left in good faith , the extension of this principle a Ia Williams is not justifiable.
Logically, it leads to the justification of various forms of genital activity outside
of marriage. Thus, there is a deplorable situation in the contemporary Western
Church where many of the faithful are misled by false teaching on sexual issues
discussed in this review. Then it is said that we must not disturb their confused
IOOd faith . What the Church needs is a comprehensive presentation of the truth of
the magisterium's teaching on all these moral questions. But it is unlikely that
lllch shall take place as long as the magisterium keeps silence concerning teachings
contrary to received doctrine spread by influential dissenting theologians.
The vocational perspectives contain valid psychological insights mixed with
questionable assertions. Father Paul K . Thomas, for example, can be very informative on tribunal procedures involving marriages where homosexuality is given as
the reason for annulment, but he assumes that 10 percent of American males are
truly homosexual, and that the Kinsey Institute has established in its 1981 report
that homosexuality is as "natural'' as heterosexuality (p. 225 ). There are no
ltatistics which demonstrate that 10 percent of American males are homosexual,
and there are many reputable psychiatrists (almost half the total number) who do
not regard homosexual tendency as psychologically natural and normal. Yet
Thomas terms the views of these professionals "outdated. " It should be noted ,
llloreover that Thomas's authorities use the word "natural" differently than
church d~cuments. Again, Thomas quotes John McNeill approvingly that many
homosexuals hide their sexual identity through selfish fear, and then exhorts them
to · reveal their identity because otherwise "you leave behind a deception and
falaehood unworthy of Christ's followers" (p. 229).
I believe that Thomas is wrong on this issue. After 28 years of working with
homosexual persons, I know many who have hidden their sexual identity for
rtaaons of prudence. To call them deceitful is a great injustice.
Father Basil Pennington would not agree with Father Thomas, who has become
Ill advocate for a cause. On the whole, Pennington makes good sense . He holds
that seminarians or religious who are trying to lead a chaste life do not have to
ltveai their sexual identity to their confreres or feel guilty of deceiving them (p.
241). But he advises the homosexual candidate to be open with his spiritual
director and major superior. To do less would not be honest. It will also relieve
them of unbearable pressures . One may challenge, however, Pennington 's opinion
that the vocation father "should be able to embrace another man and hold him
When he needs to be held" [italics added] (p. 238) . This is a strange position, to
lllake it a necessary quality of counseling that one should be able to embrace and
to hold another human. It is one thing to say that it is licit to do so, and another
to aay that one should do so. Good professionals do not see the need to hold their
homOSexual clients (or their heterosexual) and it is not because they are afraid of
inaulging in genital acts.
Although Sister Marguerite Kropinak opens her essay with some general considll'ations smacking of advocacy for steady homosexual genital relationships, she
handles the question of friendships in religious life with delicacy and balance.
'llte final essay, by Father Nugent, is concerned with gay and celib~te pries~s.
Nurent is conversant with clerical and religious thinking on the subject. He IS,
~ver, a persuasive advocate of the homosexual position, presenting the views
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of Schillebeeckx and Luke Salm in such a way that these authors ap J:. r more
reasonable than magisterial teaching. From the context, it is clear tha t
agrees
with their conclusions. He quotes Schillebeeckx , for example, askin g ; he ther
physical sexual abstinence of itself has a religious value. Schillebeecb
,e)ieves
that an affirmative answer to this question amounts to a negative vie of sex·
uality. To this view, one may respond that if you remove the genital e ression
from the concept of conjugal chastity and maintain that abstinence fr o
genital
activity is of no importance for the reality of celibacy, then you have ( ·~ ntially
altered the concepts of both marital fidelity and consecrated celibac) Genital
expression or abstinence from such is a personal act. While it is not the w >le, it is
an essential part.
Granted there are valuable truths in these essays, they present a dis tc• :~d view
of homosexual activity, because, with few exceptions , they do not • ept the
truth taught by Humanae Vitae , that the fundamental meaning o human
sexuality includes both the procreative and unitive dimensions essen . lly and
inherently related to one another. In various ways, this volume de' · ops the
teaching that homosexual activity is natural to a certain proportion o f t: human
race who are homosexual in orientation . . Eventually the Church will orne to
accept this position, but meanwhile we must make it clear' that those wh ' express
their homosexual love in a committed relationship are in accord with t h Gospel.
Such is the message of this book. It challenges theologians to articulat e he con·
trary thesis, namely , that homosexual persons are morally bound by ,:, e same
norms of chastity as heterosexual persons, and that they are able to !ea rl a chaste
life by the grace of God and by the support of others who share th e ir ideal of
chastity.
-John F. Harvey ,
S.F.S.
DeSales Theologic al Center

Are You Moving?
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a d ifferent address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and
more costly: Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with
your address will be most helpful.
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